some of the more radical elements and openings presented in Ravages

as well as how to (mis)read Ravages politically in relation to affairs in the world

we begin with this portion from chapter 7 that I've featured on several occasions (mainly to point out how there's a complementary discourse to the morale theory that readers don't notice as much - and also to remind people that guys like Liu Zong and Li Deng are Ravages characters too)

I bring this up again to illustrate that a more critical view (sympathetic to those 'from below' or 'at the margins') is already teased out early on in Ravages, even if in effect these hints are overshadowed 90% of the time by heroic tales and elite machinations

now many readers recall chapter 7 primarily in terms of Lu Bu's solo commando raid, but let's pay closer attention to what is discussed in the page

on the one hand, there's the statement about how rumors are powerful weapons especially during stalemates (from the view of those in control, this is about psychological management to boost allied troop morale (with positive spin) and dampen enemy troop morale (with negative spin))

on the other hand, there's the expose on how legends are manufactured in a process of erasing the complexities of collective effort in favor of more epic accounts of individual glory (more than just the question of whether some specific event is accurately portrayed or whether certain people are rightly credited, the more systematic skewing of historical accounts is in terms of framing events as achievements of 'great men' - but then again as Huang Da says in 214 who doesn't like heroic tales)

yet the upshot is, part of the reason these stories get retold and repackaged throughout history (and history is in part a history of the stories we tell ourselves and pass on to generations) is that in some sense they affect and influence people (that is to say, the stories don't just replicate on their own, they spread because people embrace them and can act in response to them), and thus even if legends end up erasing the deeds of the people, it's also the deeds of the people that help spread and enshrine legends

to put it more simply, the legend of Lu Bu or the one-eyed assassin may be distorted (and may have even been strategically disseminated to sow fear into the hearts of others, setting off a vicious spiral of exaggeration and awe) but at the end of the day if not for the enthusiastic and fearful responses of those who heard the rumors and fled the encounters, would those legends even last?

again, when it comes to the morale theory, readers usually remember the 3 tricks on how to downplay enemy commanders to preserve morale (basically coping mechanisms to prevent fear from paralyzing the troops - and inducing mass defections), but at the heart of the discourse is the realization that it's the pawns who fight the wars even if the masterminds strive to rig the playing field (with the labor of said pawns)

the tug of war among various legends basically represents the view from the top (as various factions struggle and scheme to uphold one over another, to boost one's troops while dampening those of the enemy)
the view from the bottom would emphasize how rank and file conscripts from various sides respond to the competing rumors, and the ones that 'sell' more have a greater effect

incidentally, the obvious insight about the centrality of the masses in mass activities (after all, of what use are the schemes and generals if the troops don't follow through) opens up all sorts of followup questions and teachings about how to manage morale and keep people in line (and this is where the schemes - and especially the gimmicks and charismatic techniques - come in basically to aid and goad people into following orders with confidence)

now the reason I painstakingly point out these straightforward points about political dynamics is that since Ravages revels in various sorts of power moves and scheming games, those reading might end up overlooking that those things are there as part of struggles over how to win over or pacify the people

the only thing preventing Ravages from being an outright revolutionary text is that it still pays more attention to elite factions and doesn't prioritize the standpoint of class domination and struggle, but the seeds of subversion are there

now a more straightforward reading of the black text in 151 would revolve around the contradiction of how the ideological conceits of an emperor inherently 'owning' the land and legitimately 'ruling over' various subjects result from imperial armies and power blocs conquering other peoples and seizing frontier lands (or alternatively, usurping control from former regimes)

a more subtle reading builds on the contradiction and highlights how the imperial edifice (supported by power blocs and other apparatuses) is premised on pacifying/conquering the populace, and that whether or not the succession or transition is 'peaceful' or 'violent' the passage from one ruler or regime to another always involves reiterating the broader process of keeping people in line

to put it in another way, it's when the pacification is considerably disrupted (whether by intrigues from the inside, or threats from the outside - or rather the disobedience of the masses) that the viability of a given arrangement of forces (under some figurehead leader) is called into question

is this still the imperial palace if the emperor has already left

viewed from above, the question hints at how in the imperial scheme of things it is the son of heaven (in coordination with the loyal ministers and subordinate nobles) who gets to declare which places would be used for what purposes (the imperial palace is wherever the emperor decides to live, etc.)

viewed from below, the question hints at how the pretensions and claims of authority and sovereignty can easily collapse once people are no longer pacified to keep playing along...

many readers may remember how Chen Gong publicly cornered Cao Cao on a rhetorical level in 258, but his farewell address to parents is arguably the more politically potent statement with subversive hints on various levels

there is the direct response to the 'confucian' double-bind expected of every subject and made worse by situations of unrest (the burdens of serving the higher authority of the ruler (even if it means dying for the realm) while respecting the basic authority of the parent - which includes surviving to preserve one's lineage and care for the aging parent), with Chen Gong refusing to pin the blame on those conscripted and subjugated who are unable to fulfill both obligations because their lives are at the mercy of other powers

there is also a broader critique of relations of domination at play, given how Chen Gong reframed the situation (by calling the 'unfilial' as 'fledglings', he's insinuating that they've been abandoned - by their powerless parents - to larger social forces and elite factions trying to pose as parental substitutes but are merely throwing people's lives away, and in so doing shifts the focus of criticism from people having to balance their moral obligations to the systems and institutions that try to leverage people in conflicting ways)

on a moral and ideological level, the presence of a 'fledgling' not only holds up a mirror to the parents who fail to protect and guide the child, but also scolds imperial authority for failing to step in and act as the higher parent in accordance with the heavenly mandate (after all, to use the logic of paternalistic rulership, how else would these children have ended up in more sinister hands had the legitimate authorities stepped in and acted their part)

on a more political level, this reframing calls into question the presumed authoritativeness of idealized institutions such as 'the family' or 'the imperial court' in the face of messier and more complex social arrangements and power relations (clans as power bases rather than strict lineages, regional factions, cliques within government, etc.)

and then there's the renowned loyalty is a method speech in 174

on the one hand there's the cutting-edge cynicism in the performance of dismissing loyalty discourse as just some elaborate scam to con suckers and dupes (this is what readers tend to remember the most - and even in my case it took me a while to appreciate the finer points in the followup section that I showcase here)

on the other hand what follows is basically an admission of people power, one of the few 'democratic' glimmers in the text (alongside what old Zhang said to Liaoyuan Huo in 384)

the very juxtaposition of these two threads in a single speech (plus a third line of thought about 'continuation' as evolution of consciousness, to put things in a more optimistic note 'in the long run') aptly represents the tensions in Ravages as it simultaneously revels in methods of manipulation while also sneaking in strident critiques of power relations

the scandal then becomes, how is it that people ultimately hold the power but certain segments and forces manage to maintain leverage and control over that power

now I don't think I need to elaborate much on the trickery part as Sun Ce conveys it with such smug bluntness, haha

but this portion (and what exactly is so people-friendly about it) may need some more clarification

the first part of the statement denies that loyalty and righteousness legitimately 'belong' to the warmongering lords (that is to say, loyalty and righteousness are not some debts that the people somehow have to pay back to the lords, loyalty and righteousness are not assets that inherently flow into the lords by virtue of their presumed superior social standing, etc.), which is tantamount to claiming that the lords do not really have that much power and virtue on their own - since those flow from the people they manage to leverage and manipulate

the second part of the statement affirms that loyalty and righteousness are matters that stem from what living beings desire in common (this is a bit tricky to unpack, it's not so much that all desire to be loyal subjects and righteous paragons (according to some set standard), rather it's that the various articulations and traditions of loyalty and righteousness arise from what all strive and yearn for - in the sense that one learns to be loyal to what one dedicates one's heart to or that one learns to stand righteously about the path one commits to and believes in), which is tantamount to claiming that people exert their power based on what they devote themselves to

this casts the cynical portion in another light, as the lords have to resort to various methods of morale management and pacification because they don't get to automatically receive loyalty and righteousness from people (and thus the foundation for regimes and empires is conquest and subjugation that ironically depend on the labor of the already conquered, and so on)

now before I resume, it would be important to clarify and reiterate a few matters

Ravages for one thing does not dwell upon disputes regarding 'forms of government' (this is why no one speaks about abolishing the imperial system or setting up republics), and it does not explicitly provide a revolutionary manifesto on what is to be done (no bold stances calling for the abolition of class society, for example), which means that certain matters and notions simply don't get that much (direct and sustained) exposure if at all throughout the series - though this doesn't prevent readers from adding 'extensions' and 'twists' to the insights in relation to their background contexts and learning

more generally, even within its bounded scope Ravages doesn't merely prop up just one ideological stance but instead tries to explore and unpack various opinions and orientations (it's just that certain voices (many of them representing elite strata) are more prominently displayed than others throughout the narrative - and this is further compounded by how certain characters appear more appealing to a bunch of people and thus their musings are celebrated more depending on the audience)

I think Sun Quan tackled it for a bit, when he said that if root won't be completely 'destroyed', then the fruit gonna be all the same - to explain how the half-assed approach of Sun clan, in case if they were to given in to Cao Cao's ordeal when he tried to buy them all, would have resulted in the same thing that kickstarted their road against the corruption. I would not say that he advocated for the change of the whole system, but I am interested in what would he change in terms of governance, if he were to come out on top, because obviously it would turn corrupt sooner or later... but it also tells that Sun Quan is not really goodie two shoes and probably does not mind corruption if it comes from his family

at most Sun Quan (just like Yuan Shu but without the ostentatiousness of declaring a new imperial regime even though he does so later on) is making a declaration of separatism, but it doesn't quite call for a significant transformation of the system (the closest to that would be the millenarian sects, but mainly in terms of changing the cosmological alignment of the imperial order - and we have yet to see what else they want to achieve)

I totally agree with Sun Quan being a separatist, and it was the "official" reason why Wu declares independence (Jiangdong is too far from central so it will benefit from local rules). With that being said, it sounds a little bit suspect, as remember this record was written during Jin dynasty, so there was already self-censorship (bias) going on trying to portray Wu as rogue states rather than its own dynasty. Indeed, Chen Shou refers to Suan Quan as "King of Wu" instead of the title "Emperor" (eventhough he referred to Liu Shan with such title)

for convenience, one can classify the 'politically relevant' discourses throughout Ravages into 3 paths

first there are the high-minded principles and ideological frameworks about proper approaches to governance or ideal characteristics for rulership, the stuff that easily fits into the 'philosophizing' aspect of Ravages (note that while the factions debate about the mixture or order of methods and qualities, there remains broad (non-democratic) consensus that to address the crisis in the realm certain 'lords' must step in and that the people will have to be guided and managed toward certain directions - and that various techniques and arrangements of control and leverage are expedient assets for keeping people in order for the sake of some greater good)

I should note further that the factions do not fall along strictly sectarian or scholastic lines (it's not as though one team is strictly 'confucian' while another is purely 'taoist' or something like that, all of the factions mix and match and misread the teachings but in different ways - plus it also helps that the texts and sages also tend to borrow insights from one another)

the second lane (which very much muddles and distorts the first) is more aligned with the 'scheming' aspect of Ravages, and revolves around the realpolitik of pursuing (and disguising) ulterior self-serving agenda through various stratagems and intrigues, with the relevant points being more focused on whose party - for the most part still of the elite strata since they have more leverage and resources) gets to dominate and by what effective means (and how people can be duped or cornered into supporting which banner or slogan)

the third (the track I'm trying to highlight in the current discussion, but often gets overlooked) concerns the critical undercurrents that interrogate arrangements and contradictions of power - and at times tease out more radical and 'democratic' voices buried amidst the power struggles

the thing to note about Ravages is that its wide-ranging and unrelenting examination of how power flows and operates - at the expense of people while relying on their labor and responses - (to the point where the series is less about battlefield encounters and more about ruses and machinations to discipline bodies and pacify hearts and conquer minds) paves the way for a more potent critique of warfare and statecraft than just the broad moral indignations of mass suffering inflicted by large-scale conflict (which the series also has, but which tends to get blunted and muted by all the scheming plus heroic gimmicks)

the question though is whether more readers would keep this in mind and take the insights to heart...

having already covered how loyalty emerges from people dedicating their hearts (and pointing out the paradox whereby the people ultimately have the power to give or withhold loyalty but the various factions have managed to leverage this power to their benefit), we can also revisit the discourse of blatant disloyalty and what else it reveals about people and power

now the easy temptation (especially since the likes of Lu Bu and Sima Yi appear as consummate practitioners) is to read disloyalty mainly in terms of individualistic and opportunistic behavior (backstabbing and selling others out to get ahead, fleeing a sinking ship and moving on to greener pastures, etc.), and 123 manages to offer a counterpoint and rebuke to such an approach (given that acts of betrayal ultimately depend on structures of loyalty, secretly diverted to alternative centers of devotion)

another thing to note about the ethos of individualized disloyalty is that such acts don't even necessarily upend larger social structures (for instance, cutthroat market competition fuels marketized societies - which generate further contradictions and crises), and that skillful regimes and rulers can play this game of pitting subjects against one another to prevent rebellions

considering that disloyalty always involves the process of shifting allegiances and devotion (at times in secret, cleverly disguised by hypocritical displays of loyalty), all it takes to defuse the threat is to identify the hidden object of devotion and use that as leverage (thus those who crave for wealth can be bribed to 'remain loyal', those who crave security can be threatened and reassured to 'remain loyal', etc.), and this is basically the path of governing through self-interest

but what happens if the disloyalty is not dispersed and discrete but collective and large-scale? therein lies an avenue of people power, as regimes can collapse and armies can dissolve the moment those involved walk away and switch sides en masse (note that what prompted Lu Bu to reflect hard was upon seeing how his troops could readily abandon him once he no longer inspires awe or stimulates their greed)

thus the real power of disloyalty (and we see this in uprisings, rebellions, strikes, etc. - and how regimes move hard to try to contain them before it's too late) consists in not simply someone selling others out for gain, but large numbers of people no longer dedicating their hearts to some given regime that depends on the labor of the devotees

the lives of (loyal) soldiers (who uphold the duty of following what their lord commands) can seem as insignificant as a goose feather since each rank-and-file recruit is replaceable and disposable, but the loyalty of those lives turns out to be as heavy as mount Tai (for without it, who would the higher-ranking commanders throw away to save their own lives?)

by connecting the message of disloyalty throughout Ravages to a wider view about social forces and arrangements (also echoed in Ravages), one picks up not just some edgy praise for individual self-preservation but also a considerably subversive vision

and yet arc after arc the transformative mass upheavals never seem to happen (and when the masses do rise up, they're engineered to benefit certain parties), we're still stuck reading about elite factions jockeying for hegemony, and so on...

to have a sense of what it means to read Ravages in a more politically nuanced light, first we consider the moral and principled layer of discourse

so 'in theory' Liu Xie (and Liu Shan in 480) have a point, why can't people just try to get along and deal with their disagreements peacefully, doesn't war inflict suffering on all sides, and so on

now if one takes the social-conservative (and very much authoritarian) loyalist path, one would insist that things wouldn't have been so bad if only people knew their place (note the classic 'confucian' dictum of letting rulers rule and ministers minister) and didn't harbor dangerous ambitions

now if one takes the meritocratic (but still authoritarian) path of major reform, one would insist that things wouldn't have been so bad if only the ruler didn't mess up or if only a more capable ruler would have been in charge and established better rules and institutions

in any case, note that the various principles and approaches to governance don't necessarily advocate widespread large-scale conflict to correct improper situations (though they all involve pacifying people), so we'll have to turn to another layer of discourse to deal with the messier realities

as readers are well aware, Ravages is also full of these hard-nosed 'realistic' assessments of the situation, as if to respond to the scolding of the 'idealists' and answer the cries of those suffering (thus the incessant repetition of how rulers and hegemons have to dirty their hands to get the job done, or how the self-serving and the principled alike have to wield power (and control people) to achieve their agenda, how the loyalists have to use power to suppress the corrupt or how fighting evil tendencies just by appealing to principle is like throwing an egg against a rock, etc.)

and because just about every faction plays dirty at some point (though in varying degrees and styles) and uses the same sort of excuses (to the point where it doesn't even matter whether the faction cares about the greater good or parochial interests), everyone comes out looking corrupt and hypocritical, and they may all very well have mixed motives (otherwise, why couldn't they have just talked things out unless they wanted to advance their positions and claim hegemony under their preferred scenario of justice)

here's the issue that both the principled and the cynical overlook: isn't it the case that these warmongers are able to trample upon enemies and bystanders only because they were able to get a significant chunk of the people to go along with their program?

so the principled say that war is evil and brings suffering (and propose their various programs of governance as the solution), the more hard-nosed would respond that in some cases organized mass violence and deceptive scheming are unavoidable and expedient (if one wants to secure certain interests and goods - and especially because there are other corrupt elements standing in the way who don't care about the greater good), but in the first place aren't we in this situation because for some reason or another people have been sucked into machineries of power and domination (and that one path to freedom consists in mass disloyalty against any pretender - because no machinery of power and domination can operate without the labor of the masses providing the fuel)

and so this brings us to the scandal, if the people ultimately have the power, then why do certain lords manage to leverage that power and sacrifice the people in the process?

if emperors were once commoners and anyone can lay claim to that position, then why support any lord?

note that Sun Ce (and Yuan Shu in 174) came to a similar self-serving hypothesis, that somehow people tend to be 'slavish' and this allows a select few to tap into this and lord over others

now the easy temptation would be to embrace the explanation at face-value (and in many ways those who harbor deep suspicions regarding 'democratic' programs or those who have a more authoritarian political outlook would likely just nod in agreement), but I would suggest reading this segment more attentively regardless of how one aligns politically

note that first Sun Ce makes the claim about slavish traits (and that somehow 'people in this land' (more specifically the raw states people of the central plains) have 'inherited' them), but it isn't really elaborated how this came to be, so the assessment doesn't necessarily imply that people are inherently and immutably slavish at their very core (otherwise how would that explain the emergence and dominance of elites among the people), only that at least they took on and developed these traits over time (and it doesn't help matters that regimes and factions nurture such tendencies over generations through various tricks including the selective use of loyalty discourse)

and then there's the followup hypothetical musing, that even supposing that everyone starts off on roughly the same level, the assertion is that somehow 'someone' (or better yet some faction) will manage to 'stand out' and trick others into fighting one another and following orders (but then we must ask, how does this standing out emerge and solidify? and even in this arrangement the political secret remains to be that in order for some to rise and stand out, others must have first offered their support and devotion (because as noted in 174, loyalty is not automatically yielded to lords but stems from what people devote themselves to) and that over time the disparities are accumulated and reinforced)

the subsequent page revisits the notion of 'continuation' (and I've noted that this also has some evolutionary undertones), framing the position of humans at the top of the mortal pyramid (and so therefore 'heaven arranged' humans to go after one another, but the explanation alone doesn't shed light on how some eventually manage to lord over others, and arguably there is tension between the broader openings of continuation to further growth and the stultifying condition of slavishness attributed to people at large, which is why we can't simply take the discourse at face-value as a straightforward and cogent case - but instead we read this as a manifestation of contradictions within Sun Ce's thinking)

at any rate, how one responds to and makes sense of the paradox I just brought up (people have the power, but somehow lords manage to gain leverage over that power) pretty much depends on the varying assumptions one brings to the table (and the ways Ravages brings up these issues and teases out further lines of thought based on where readers come from should have made the series a productive site of discussion, and yet many readers remain silent as seen in the lack of engagement in the current exposition - even as others would go on to replicate more simplistic arguments when they talk about other works)

now obviously the psychological profiles of various people (and how these are influenced by various factors) are complex (and amusingly enough, Sun Ce deciding to treat things like a hunt can be read as a cop-out and evasion to the more complex processes of power at work -which led to his father's death and his daddy issues), but I'd like to focus on the desire for comfort and how this emerges as one of the most notable points of leverage that elites manage to use on the people (and this segues to the 'immovable yet twisted rationality' mentioned in 372)

now comfort is not a bad thing and we all seek some level of it, what's tricky is how these honest yearnings (and the appraisals that lead us to devote our hearts to something or someone) get twisted up and mangled in relation to competing social forces

the warring states is framed as this bloody traumatic phase that awakened people (or rather the elites) to the necessity (or decisive comparative advantage) of unification, and that by the time Qin was ascendant people went along (or were subjugated to go along) with the trajectory of having the strongest power 'naturally' gobble up the rest to 'end the chaos'

but the twisted character of this trajectory can be seen more clearly when we start asking what it was that enabled the warring states to make war in the first place (locals were motivated to secure their own local safety (even at the expense of others) which led to them being conned and cajoled and intimidated into supporting local war machines that then went on to fight one another, and so on) and why even the project of unification (at a given locality) is doomed to replicate the cycle even if achieved considering that after unification Qin went on to militarize further and turn its attention to 'outside forces'

one need only look at the cycles of arms races and the beefing up of police forces in the name of security to see the twists and turns of this honest yearning for comfort leading up to all sorts of anxieties...

and taking these dynamics into consideration we can revisit the message of disloyalty and see it not just as an avenue for individual self-advancement but as a collective means to keep things in check (because again, who can wage war if there are no loyal soldiers willing to die on the battlefield for some elite interest)

now let's take a look how the various political discourses (and the interplay of loyalty and disloyalty) unfold in Ravages when it comes to the issue of 'surrender'

while those who appeal to loyalty (to one's own faction until the very end) would despise the shame and betrayal, in a sense there is benevolence (and dare I say even loyalty, but to a higher good and the welfare of the people) in capitulating rather than endangering lives in futile struggles - though we shouldn't forget the flip side that it would have been benevolent for factions not to engage in campaigns of conquest and subjugation to begin with (only that the factions are stubborn, so the victims are cornered to bear the burden of minimizing harm by going along)

on a more pragmatic level there's also the advice to temporarily yield to greater powers in order to buy time and prepare for a future comeback (this is where considerations of individualized and localized disloyalty usually come in - and which the various players try to leverage all the time when dealing with smaller power bases, goading certain people to switch sides and collude on the inside)

but when we turn our gaze to the core issues and contradictions around people and power, the questions emerge: how did the 'strong' manage to leverage and assemble a section of the people to enforce certain things on the 'weak' and other sections of the people? would these situations of asymmetry and domination even happen if people collectively exercised mass disloyalty? what tricks and techniques allowed elites and regimes and ruling classes to get people to offer their devotion and labor to the point of building up the war machines?

these considerations thus add a sinister twist to the statement in 484 that conquering the world is some sort of 'science' (that is to say, a body of knowledge and skill) and how conquering the hearts and minds is even more profound... because ultimately, people have the power to withhold support and defect en masse (and so therefore it takes a whole lot of talent and study to be able to turn people into loyal soldiers ready to die and kill for the cause or to uphold elite interests)

and overall, Ravages is concerned with the many ways and methods some people are able to pacify and control others, with different factions picking and choosing tricks from a shared playbook (and it is in light of this key thread that we are able to read the occasional manifestos of disloyalty especially as an oblique declaration of resistance - in the absence of explicit invocations of radically democratic visions and theories)

I suppose in wrapping up this short exposition we can revisit the heated exchange in 544, as it aptly illustrates the difference between an outlook centered on governance and pacification, and a perspective that highlights political struggles and contradictions (at this point it doesn't really matter who the apologist is defending, replace Cao Cao with any other warlord and the paternalistic frame remains the same)

note that while the apologist highlights how the current regime he is living under manages to 'uphold order' and 'provide security' (the things we come to expect from governments and leaders - even though these get dashed again and again since the wrong people always seem to be in charge), the detractor focuses on how this sense of security is extracted from those who have to submit and those who have to sacrifice their lives for the cause (the analysis can be extended to the supposed threats, for they too rely on the power of people to be able to pose some sort of danger)