Ravages of Time (vol. 22) and Fate/Zero

 

I was rewatching Fate/Zero and it left me unsatisfied, so I decided to compare it to the Ravages of Time, to note from where was my dissapointment was coming from. Now Fate/Zero may not be set in the historical setting, but it does tackle on similar nihilistic themes, hence the comparison. That will also showcase that there are more stories that can be compared to RoT, even if at first glance that may not seems so (another example being Katanagatari). Unfortunately for F/Z, it is too ambitious for its own good, considering its number of episodes, which leads to its shallowness in terms of thematic exploration and general flaws in terms of plot/character-writing. Despite that, I still considering it to be a worthy series, as it has fairly fleshed-out and developed cast with a tragic tone.

There may be more comparable topics, but here I picked only two of them:

Emiya's utilitarianism

Emiya's methods/ideology maybe is pragmatic, but they did not come from him thinking "what's the best for humanity?"... no, they came from his childhood trauma when he could not kill his childhood crush, who was begging him to kill her to not spread the virus, which resulted in spreading the zombie-like virus, thus the whole village was gone in mere hours (tbf, its pretty unrealistic for a child to suddenly gain resolve, in such a stressful situation, and kill his own father, because its for the greater good... needless to say, I disliked how forced the whole episode was)... even after that, when Emiya became a mercenary, he was constantly witnessing the evils of humanity and he still was losing his loved ones (thus the wish for the miracle, to save the humanity from its core instinct).

Thing is, because of his mental trauma, he was only fixated on the KILLING part. This was showcased in one of the latest episodes, when Grail itself proved that he was always deciding on killing the smaller part, instead of finding the actual solutions (case being the two sinking ships, one with 200 population and one with 300 population, when he needed to choose whichever to fix, but Emiya decided to help 300 strangers, by killing 200 people around him, instead of collecting 500 people on one fixed ship and so on). Our Emiya did not care about him being proven wrong, though. He continued destroying everything and did not wish for anything (with contrived reason "cost is too high"... its contrived, because he already paid the price, so in the present time, there was no cost for him - he just had to wish something else). He did not develop... up until when "lava" came from the sky, after which he changed his mind off-screen...)

Hence why its just a coping mechanism for him and also why he was being hypocritical, when he said to Saber, that people shed blood just for the sake of valor and glory (basically, both him and Saber (at least, from Emiya's Point of View) are doing it for personal reasons and he has not right to talk like that to Saber

On the other hand, in RoT's case, we do not have such personal case of utilitarianism, just for the sake of artificially proving something wrong, when it comes to character Zhuge Liang. Even more, Zhuge Liang himself talked about similar motives in 180th chapter.

Ravages of Time - Volume 22

to lengthen the session I plan to feature 8 pics per chapter, for a grand total of 64 pics, with discussions along the way

we begin with a recap of the premise for the events to come

Liu Bei accepts an imperial edict (which Cao Cao arranged to have the emperor promulgate) to attack Yuan Shu, who in turn seeks to collaborate with Lu Bu to take Liu Bei out of the picture (since as a Han loyalist he would be a nuisance to Yuan Shu’s Zhongjia regime)

of course at this point Yuan Shu has been weakened somewhat due to Sun Ce’s scheme as well as Liu Ye’s betrayal, and thus he cannot afford to have Liu Bei ruin things further

175 also brings up one of the recurring topics in Ravages, namely the unreliability of historical accounts (particularly the ‘official records’)

to be clear, it’s not as if Ravages is saying that since the records are biased we shouldn’t learn from the records we receive and uncover (or worse, using the premise of unreliable records as an excuse to justify supporting one’s favorite 'vilified’ factions in the past)

rather, because the records are biased we have to learn carefully (and acknowledge that records are not just representations but they are also tools)

the paradoxical position of Ravages after all is that it uses its sources to criticize them (and without the sources and the stories of scheming, what would there be to criticize about)

its just like what Pang Tong was saying about cults. they may be false, but you can guide people with them

back to Zhang Fei, his response isn’t just an instance of disparaging official historians (with the emphasis on 'official’, since the dynasties of the central plains actually hire such positions to come up with sanctioned narratives about the past) but there’s also a self-reflective aspect to it

how would one act not only with the thought of how one will be remembered, but also anticipating that one’s actions will be misunderstood and misinterpreted as part of schemes to come

it’s almost as if he’s daring future generations to look at him how they (or we) would, so long as he gets his job done

and we’re also reminded that Chen Deng’s privileged position in Xuzhou is partly due to how he bankrolls the security and military apparatuses in the province (that’s why he outright flaunts about not having to pay the usual taxes, since he pays in other ways)

an instance of corruption to be sure, but he’s still playing his part in the province (while seeking to benefit from the dysfunctional arrangement at the same time)

on a side note, Ravages doesn’t really do well in showcasing the official functions of the various positions in the Han government (but then again, with Han undergoing a slow collapse, this hardly matters)

Ravages can’t even be bothered to display an imperial court scene with the proper protocol

and it seems Liaoyuan Huo hanging around with Chen Deng had another purpose (after all, if he was trying to search for Xiao Meng’s whereabouts, why would he suddenly wind up in Liu Bei’s turf)

now back to the scheming, we see the 16 moves begin to take form with plans and revelations such as this

to recap, the premise is that Lu Bu and Yuan Shu are colluding to drive Liu Bei out of Xuzhou (while Cao Cao arranges for the mess in Xuzhou behind the scenes so that he can proceed with his own move elsewhere)… but since Zhang Fei is aware of that (or rather, suspects that something like that is going on), he’s making plans of his own, and here it involves luring Lu Bu into making a premature attack (this is where the deliberate rumors about Zhang Fei’s drunken recklessness come in)

we also see plans being made on the part of Yuan Shu’s forces

basically, given that there’s an imperial edict to attack Yuan Shu, the plan is to lure Liu Bei into expending resources and troops in a protracted campaign, while Lu Bu takes advantage of the situation and seizes control of Xuzhou, forcing Liu Bei to withdraw to some backwater area… and even then, the Zhongjia troops are not content to simply play the role of a decoy and have Lu Bu take all the glory, so they too prepare a trap for Liu Bei on their front (though we don’t really see much of this unfold on-panel, since the focus is more on dealing with Lu Bu)

Ji Ling and Zhang Liao also speculate that Cao Cao’s imperial edict plan isn’t simply to undermine Yuan Shu, but it’s also meant to keep Liu Bei down while he’s still weak

the chapter is also a reminder that Ravages stresses the importance of meticulous preparations for campaigns of mass conflict

I daresay Ravages is willing to cut battle scenes short in favor of preparation scenes (and yes, this includes preparations for future struggles even in the midst of battle)

before ending, the chapter also features Zhuge Liang and Pang Tong watching on the sidelines (and I find it a bit puzzling why Zhuge Liang is wearing his hat here again only to lose it again off-panel come 180)

we get hints (based on Pang Tong’s insinuations) that Zhuge Liang doesn’t like Zhou Yu that much (probably due to ideological disagreements rather than personal grudges)

and there’s also an indirect allusion to the in-joke about how Sima Yi and Zhou Yu are similar in Ravages

I suppose the disagreement is that Zhou Yu doesn’t seem to prioritize Han at all (it’s one thing to serve Sun Ce with the intent of keeping him in check, like what Xun Yu plans to do with Cao Cao, and it’s another thing to just empower another hegemon from another clan at the expense of Han)

though from 159 we see that Zhuge Liang isn’t just a Han loyalist for the sake of elevating the imperial clan (Xun Yu’s brand of loyalism is more committed to the actual institutions of Han)

rather, he sees the ideal of loyalty as a way to diminish bloodshed

to put it in another way, a typical model Han loyalist would be a social-conservative who wishes to preserve what has been inherited, with changes admitted on a gradual basis while protecting the authority of current institutions 

Zhuge Liang’s way seems more to be about using the virtue and ideal of loyalty (which so happens to be directed at Han, though it could really be directed at anyone else) as a way to govern people and keep the peace (thus his suspicion about calls for regime change is not because he thinks Han is always good, but that those who seek change may have other ulterior motives in mind)

thus I’ve mentioned before that of the 8, Zhuge Liang may be the most ideologically abstract and committed (and thus the events in 180 would agonize him so much)

176 may cover the duels of a particular battle in Liu Bei’s campaign against Yuan Shu, but the narrative and textual details here cover more than just the battle

take for instance the floating text for the chapter, we can note that the Ravages 'narrative voices’ do more than just recount the story or hype certain characters (since they also take on meditative and reflective tones)

whereas the narrator in, say, something like Kingdom behaves more like a storyteller (or for example, how the narrator in LOGH is akin to a presenter of a documentary), the voices in Ravages are more like commentators performing the processes of introspection that the composer may have done and the readers are expected to do

there’s also a meta-fictive element in the chapter, as the floating voices don’t just comment on what’s going on, but also seem to comment on both the gimmicks of warfare as well as the conventions and tropes of texts about warfare (and since participants of war also make and hear tales of warfare, the conventions also bleed into the subjectivities of those who fight 'real wars’ we see this when soldiers, cops, and activists gamify their feats)

this brings us to the dual character of military campaigns involving armed people… on the one hand, there are the considerations of the balance of forces (and how to take advantage of asymmetries to deal decisive blows), and on the other hand, there are the considerations of morale (and how to manage it with gimmicks such as rumors and duels)

this also provides a good excuse for texts (Ravages included) to feature duel scenes, haha

read the comment and think back at how fight scenes in many texts involve the contenders trying to justify themselves (either in monologue form, or while openly arguing)

also note how various factions make use of propaganda to present their side in a better light while vilifying opponents

Ji Ling of course isn’t just content to make his point, he invokes the sages to make his case look wiser (just as Guan Yu dismisses arguments for regime change by noting the inscrutability of the heavenly will)

this brings me to another point, that not only can we learn from the insights of various thinkers, we can even weaponize those insights (and many regimes and societies have done just that for instance how the Han appealed to Confucius while refining 'legalist’ mechanisms to form a Confucian-Legalist political order)

(on that note it can be said that perhaps in certain instances Ravages twists the citations in ways that scholarly researchers would frown upon, but just as with historical texts the words of the philosophers are also tools in the power struggle)

this tidbit highlights the performative and spectacular aspects of war (and war stories)

we can acknowledge that when described in terms of the processes of mass slaughter, war is at its core a boring and bloody affair… but what provides the spice in the mix are the stories embedded into the event by the agents with their different passions and interests (and to enhance the drama, what else would the architects of the power struggle do but set up a good show)

thus those in command come up with ways to manage morale and hype up the troops, with the help of stunt actors who relish in the performance (because in the first place, they too have internalized the narratives of hype and glory attached to war)

similarly, skilled storytellers manipulate their audiences into getting invested in certain angles

this isn’t to say there are no interests and goals and principles at stake and that it’s all just for the drama, but at some point things get storified to motivate masses of people into following through

incidentally, the chapter provides another way of looking at historical records with a critical lens 

whereas the 'straightforward’ indictment accuses historical records of various sorts of biases and slants, the 'indirect’ meta-fictive insinuation notes at how narrative conventions and textual devices are already baked into the historical records 

  on a lighter note, it would be nice to have memes involving Xun Zheng and Yu Gi Oh (since he’s called the king of duel, haha)

he gonna activate his trap card and banish challengers to the shadow realm 

 too bad Guan Yu has a reverse trap card

now back to the zone of the duel itself (since for the most part in the re-read I’ve been highlighting the thematic elements and the social commentary) Ravages reminds readers that its approach to fighting does not shy away from underhanded tricks (for instance, Xun Zheng’s style involves taking out the horse before the rider, whereas Guan Yu’s style uses the horse mainly as a jumping pad while tricking opponents into underestimating him)

neither are interested in drawn-out jousts on horseback

I didn’t feature the pic where Liu Bei and Guan Yu talk about how one rises to fame by stepping on others, but it’s important to bring it up (especially considering that in war conquerors tend to hype up their feats by assimilating those of the vanquished and this tendency gets passed down to when we engage in power level discussions and matchups)

the floating text began its remarks on battle conventions by pointing to the speeches on morality, and it wraps up with the use of embellishments and tall tales to celebrate the glory of the winner of a given round

of course, duels on their own do not determine the outcome of a battle much less a campaign (and in Ravages the iconic duels between the big names hardly change the course of the battle, though they make for interesting dramatic subplots and moments of spectacle)

and yet in certain instances, duels and their results (and the rumors that are generated in the process) can be used as tools to manage morale or buy time before the big attack, as is the case in this chapter

thus at the end of the day it is still the soldiers who fight and win wars, albeit under the direction of the schemers and with the aid of spectacles and stunt actors

now we enter 177, the chapter that so impressed me when I first read about it in tv tropes, so much so that it led me down this path (and elevated my expectations for stories about warfare and statecraft in the process)

the chapter begins with a summary of what has been going on in Liu Bei’s front (and basically 176 is just a small part of the engagement)

recall that in 175 Zhang Liao and Ji Ling agreed on a broad strategic plan, that is to attack Liu Bei from the back (presumably this means not just Lu Bu’s backstab, but also Ji Ling luring Liu Bei to advance so far that a reserve troop can be used to cut off Liu Bei’s route back to Xuzhou)

basically at this point, even as Liu Bei brought the bulk of the troops in the campaign, Zhang Fei and Lu Bu are drafting troops and minions with the help of funds from merchants (Xu Dan on Lu Bu’s side, Chen Deng on Zhang Fei’s side)

on a side note, historical records usually label them as 'outlaws’ as if they were just a motley gang (just like how state apparatuses disparagingly call various insurgent organizations as rebels and bandits), but many such forces are more like minor warlord factions that happen to be based in the outskirts

at any rate, the plan to take over Xuzhou involves these 'outlaws’ who presumably have a grudge on Liu Bei (though of course there’s a twist to all this)

thus far

Lu Bu wants to take over Xuzhou (with the help of outlaws)

Zhang Fei wants to lure Lu Bu into a trap at the provincial seat of Xuzhou (by pretending to be reckless) 

Lu Bu plans to arrive at the city under the pretext of helping fight the outlaws on their way 

Zhang Fei plans a banquet to gather pro-Lu partisans into the main city

incidentally, the 'cheng xia yi ju’ motif is in play in the volume, insofar as the sides are trying to gather under the walls (in different ways)

what’s fascinating about the chapter is that it painstakingly notes the various factors being considered and mobilized for what is a rather minor showdown

the calendar is weaponized (Zhang Fei setting the date for the banquet, Cao Bao’s lackeys getting a convenient troop rotation schedule)

urban layouts are weaponized (Zhang Fei noting how the alleys can be used to ambush Lu Bu’s troops, Cao Bao planning to set fire to a particular quarter as a decoy, Chen Gong buying up houses as outposts)

rumors are weaponized (stories of Zhang Fei’s recklessness becoming a hot topic as reported by Chen Gong’s spies, mainly to gather more outlaws to the fray)

finances are weaponized (Chen Deng planning to bribe the outlaws to outbid Xu Dan, not to mention the extra spending to ensure Zhang Fei’s ambush troop becomes more mobile)

as the factions keep planning, the scenario becomes more and more complex

remember that the basic premise is that Lu Bu wants to capture the provincial seat and thereby control Xuzhou, while Zhang Fei wants to lure Lu Bu into a trap

for the sake of that both camps have gone as far as spreading exaggerated rumors, sending spies, rigging security schedules, laying an ambush in alleyways, preparing to set an area on fire as a decoy, anticipating the fire attack and repurposing it as a signal, etc.

and this is just the preparatory stage, like rehearsing the parlor games for the party, haha

essentially though, the plan hinges on which side the outlaws will take

supposing the outlaws join Zhang Fei, Lu Bu can be trapped in the city with little room for escape

supposing the outlaws join Lu Bu, Zhang Fei can be squeezed with Lu Bu holding the city center (if he gets there) and the outlaws positioned outside the city gates

and then there’s this page

it’s almost as if Ravages is talking about not so much the struggles and intrigues of the last days of Han, but the convoluted arrangements and contests of the 20th and 21st centuries

basically an indication that Ravages isn’t just some story about warfare and statecraft, but also a commentary on warfare and statecraft (and a commentary on stories about warfare and statecraft), in narrative form

and this makes Ravages far more sophisticated than many other tales dealing with similar topics, as exemplified in the

though I really wish there were more texts to rival Ravages in this respect

ultimately it’s these complex aspects (rather than the usual moments) that drew me to the series in the first place (and in this regard I may be part of a super-minority) and while it doesn’t represent a scholarly innovation (though I argue that Ravages can be a site for further research) it nonetheless raises the bar with regard to what stories can do (and how they can stimulate further thinking)

to briefly review the situation

Lu Bu (who is colluding with Yuan Shu) plans to take over Xuzhou by first taking the administrative seat (with the help of outlaws) while Liu Bei is away fighting Yuan Shu’s forces (as a result of an imperial edict arranged by Cao Cao)

Zhang Fei (who wants to pre-emptively get rid of a potential threat) plans to lure Lu Bu and his associates into a trap by organizing a banquet (and spreading disinfo about his recklessness)

Cao Bao’s henchmen are in charge of the security detail on the day of the banquet as well as preceding days

Chen Deng pours in financial resources to help Zhang Fei entrap Lu Bu

(a reminder that both Chen Deng and Cao Bao are influential in the province, having served Tao Qian previously)

the gimmick is that Lu Bu comes to the city under the pretext of sending aid when in fact he’s planning to seize the city center before the outlaws arrive

Zhang Fei for his part arranges for only the south and east gates to be open on the day of the banquet, since the streets in those quarters are narrower and good for an ambush

Cao Bao, given his influence within the city, plans to set a fire on a certain spot in a bid to distract the hidden ambush troop

Chen Deng is persuaded to spend even more resources to increase the mobility of the ambush troop, with the anticipated fire to be seen as a signal to commence the operation

as a side plan, it seems the troops supposed to supply Liu Bei are also given secret orders to attack Lu Bu’s base in Xiaopei on their way back

on the day of the party, both sides exercise extra caution, mutually anticipating one another’s plans

Cao Bao may have brought several guests and escorts with him, but the number of collaborators is too many to list (with some acting as scouts on the lookout for suspicious movements throughout the city)

in turn, the ambush troops try to keep themselves hidden so as not to attract the attention of the security forces under Cao Bao

as anticipated, while Lu Bu is also on his way, Zhang Liao proceeds to enter first to lead the vanguard (and is let in with the help of insiders at the gates)

we’ve already been told that the ambush is set in the east and south quarters due to the narrow streets there, so the closure of the north and west gates is less about keeping spies out (Cao Bao’s collaborators are already present in the city) and more about forcing Lu Bu to go through the narrow streets

of course, throughout the party, Zhang Fei is still keeping up appearances of being a carefree drunkard, to make Cao Bao lower his guard and strike prematurely

an amusing part of the chapter concerns the code words and phrases being used to convey information (basically a pretext for Chen Mou to engage in minor word play, haha)

incidentally, many stories of stratagems and intrigue in the central plains have involved puns and innuendos and veiled insinuations, so this is in keeping with the tradition

additionally, the reference to Zhurong is a deliberate one, a hint that a fire attack is about to begin anytime soon

in another note, while it’s nice to see Ravages incorporate tidbits of folklore here and there (ranging from Tengri to Chisongzi and Chiyou), aside from the Taiping sects we don’t see religious movements and practices being explored in much detail throughout the series… hopefully this lacuna is addressed in future developments

the security scheme even involves the commoners as part of an effort to feign a sense of panic and manufacture controlled chaos (basically a 'bavarian fire drill’ in the language of conspiracies, haha)

I just want to say that in terms of banquet intrigues, Ravages really raised the bar with this one

other twists and turns and traps at feasts and parties simply pale in comparison to the '16 moves’

too bad this minion has been named in deluxe volume 11 as Lu Chang, but I like how he and Cao Bao have complementary outfits

and so with a nicely drawn fish dish as a signal (not to mention Zhang Fei offering to show guests how he fetches items), the real party is about to begin

there is a particular policy objective (which will be revealed more clearly in the chapters ahead) there is the broad strategic plan (that is to say, the overall struggle for the city and by extension the province)

there are the operational details (basically the preparation and implementation of the 16 moves)

I stress operations rather than tactics since Ravages seldom gets into the granular aspects of specific maneuvers

the nice thing about 179 (for purposes of re-reading) is that it’s relatively fast-paced, with the players beginning to take action

basically the initial battle plan of Lu Bu’s main invasion force involves splitting into 3 groups (the first to handle Zhang Fei’s troop, the second to secure the gate, the third to head to the city center following Zhang Liao’s vanguard)

to be fair, throughout this charade, Zhang Fei made sure to keep the commoners safe using appropriate evacuation protocols (and arguably, Lu Bu’s battle plan doesn’t involve causing that much mayhem and disturbance, but only inflicting enough to distract Zhang Fei and secure the city)

also, another interesting feature of Ravages is that it includes occasional snippets of commoners commenting on the situation

in many cases they are shown to be perceptive (and at times rather cynical too)

they may not control that much leverage in the power struggle, but they are not completely disempowered as they are still able to make some sense of what’s going on and articulate what they have in mind

posting this just to showcase an instance of Ravages camera tricks (it just so happens that there are too many flat closeup panels by comparison)

the struggle for the city also involves its own iteration of the besiegers getting besieged, haha

also, the last Lu Bu body double to be killed on-panel

considering that 177 and 178 are 2 days apart, my speculation is that Lu Bu could have snuck in using a supply wagon perhaps on the middle day or earlier in the day of the party (knowing that Cao Bao’s henchmen handled the security detail)

And I daresay common ground of Fei and Liao to allow Lu Bu snuck in was hinted beforehand.

Just like how Liao agreed to free Meng, because it would negatively affect Lu Bu

180 is perhaps one of the heaviest (if not the heaviest) chapter in Ravages when it comes to thematic and conceptual explorations

if one doesn't dive that deeply into this, the basic outline of events in the chapter is simply: Zhuge Liang watches a battle unfold and becomes depressed

(as for the battle itself, it appears Liu Bei's forces were able to capture the stronghold at Xuyi, but it seems with considerable casualties so we don't really get to see how Yuan Shu's forces were able to ambush Liu Bei at some point)

Xuyi doesn't seem to be all that important for Yuan Shu to hold at all costs, but Liu Bei is doing it just to uphold the imperial edict (which is part of Cao Cao's diminution scheme)

one other thing to add

this chapter really put a somber twist to Zhuge Liang's moniker of 'crouching dragon' [臥龍]

that is to say, rather than simply interpreting it to mean a talent who is lurking and waiting for the right opportunity, Ravages makes it seem like the dragon crouched out of sheer grief

and during his hibernation he starts scheming hard

considering that Cao Cao marched to Nanyang in 197 AD/CE (as stated in 185) and the Chibi campaign happens in 208 AD/CE, this fits into the pattern of what Kan Ze said in 434 that Zhuge Liang's 11 years were not wasted

almost as if suggesting that if he can't preach the way in a clean way given the circumstances, he'll just have to play dirty and begin spreading heroic tales of Liu Bei along the way (pun-intended)

so the chapter opens with a general reflection about the notion of the greater good (coupled with a glaring visual metaphor)

not only are the tracks divergent, it's vague where they end or are headed to (just like the notion and the discourse of the greater good)

[大義] can be translated as 'great justice', or JUSTICE (similar to the lofty ideals discussed by Plato and handed down to the traditions of political philosophizing... harmony of parts to the whole, each getting one's due, from each according to ability and to each according to need, the hierarchy of goods, etc.)

as Zhuge Liang watches the battle unfold, his thoughts continue to run in a somber direction

he points out the contrasting situation of how from the standpoint of principle the campaign is about upholding loyalty to the realm, and yet from the standpoint of the actors on the ground the campaign represents an opportunity to rise and make gains, the greater good be damned

in this journey though, Zhuge Liang doesn't just stick to the topic of morality (recall how the nameless adviser called out Sima Yi for straying off topic, haha)

he then turns his attention to those who take part in historical processes from the margins, without being recognized by official records (who privilege the dynasties and the 'great men')

on a side note, while the story of Ravages deals with renowned figures for the most part, it also tries to include vignettes of commoners (usually with sad outcomes) as it goes along

in 180 it is presented as a silent short story, of how a kid volunteers to go to war leaving his mother behind for the motherland, only to die

now the tricky thing is, one doesn't simply get written about for the record books, one has to receive recognition first (see Liaoyuan Huo's musings in 136 about talents who get buried without making a name)

so in a way, Zhuge Liang's question applies to everyone in the period, even those who we now consider the main figures (based on the accounts and tales we inherit, and the reliability of which remain forever questionable), inasmuch as in their lifetimes they are caught up in the game of standing out (often by standing over others)

one can also look into the question on the bottom right as reflecting two divergent ways of looking at historical happenings: are they about the great helmsmen sailing the seas, or are they more about the waves and currents that lift some boats and drown others? do we prioritize the players and their deeds, or do we focus on the structures and trends?

as to the conflict between loyalty/devotion [忠] and righteousness/justice [義] this is a staple topic in confucian-influenced thought (see also the remarks by the floating text in 150 concerning how the ambiguity and polyvalence of who one should be loyal to leads to the virtue being undermined amidst the conflict of interpretations and interests)

note that Confucius tried to ground the cultivation of the virtues on everyday domestic practice, basically the notion of cultivating goodness one step at a time (thus starting with the family/clan), but this leads to problems once the regime is also seen as an extended family (for instance, if one's father commits a crime, will one turn him in to the state authorities)

the 'mohist' camp tries to address the issue by proposing a notion of universal love and general state welfare (something that confucians find scandalous since this dissolves family distinctions) the 'legalist' camp dissolves the issue by centering everything on the regime and its ruler (disdained on paper by Han confucians, but nonetheless partially adopted in matters of public governance, creating a robust compromise 'confucian-legalist' model that became the imperial status quo for centuries)

and then there's the tension between what one learns from the sages (generally, other thinkers) and what one learns from witnessing and partaking of the realities on the ground

of course, it's not as if there's an unbridgeable gulf between the two realms, since realities on the ground are also influenced by the ideas of certain people (usually what is aligned with the hegemonic order), and the sages who shared their thoughts also tried to learn from the realities they experienced (which may or may not have changed in certain ways)

rather, there is the complex entanglement that instead distinguishes between realities (including dominant ideas) that prevail (due to advantageous power-relations), and ideas (reflective of possible or lost realities) that do not prevail (due to disadvantageous power-relations), which brings us to the point that sages just like historical records are available as tools and weapons too

after all, if we lump 'all sages' in one side and 'reality' on the other side, what do we make of sages whose ideas happen to currently be in fashion?

in a way, the notion of loyalty persists (since soldiers serve and follow their commanders), but not in the prescribed or ideal manner Zhuge Liang would have preferred (note that in 159 he wishes to instill loyalty discourse as a way to prevent bloodshed, not instigate it on behalf of self-serving warlords)

Ravages already questions the reliability of historical accounts (especially official sanctioned records) by pointing out how biases and interests (and not simply on the level of individual preference or prejudice, but as a matter of partisan positioning and factional enforcement) influence the contents... this is alluded to in 175 and recurs in various chapters (frequently stated in a rather crude fashion, but the more nuanced framing is provided in 484 with Ma Liang stating that historical texts are also texts about warfare)

furthermore, 176 paves the way for another line of critical interrogation, by means of examining how dramatic gimmicks and narrative conventions and rhetorical devices figure into the composition of historical records (for instance, the records either fictionalize certain events, or otherwise some events themselves are generated by the masterminds for show)

180 presents yet another case, one that doesn't necessarily involve impugning the integrity and sincerity of those who write and keep and pass down stories about the past

rather, the lamentation is that historical records as representations (which means folktales or alternate retellings Ravages included don't really fare any better at any rate) are not really able to fully articulate the suffering and struggle of the innumerable masses who shape historical events yet have their efforts erased and appropriated by particular factions and personalities

see for instance Li Deng's musings in 7:

The commanding officers take the credit for a battle of hundreds. After a thousand retellings, the credit will all go to one man.

in this page, Zhuge Liang even alludes to Sun Ce's thinking about continuity (see 174, further clarified in 406), particularly the point about the expectation that people will (continue to) learn more after each passing generation

however, Zhuge Liang puts a more morbid spin on continuation

that is to say, the cycle continues whereby those who realize depart eventually, replaced by those who haven't (and would have to repeat the realization for themselves)

he does not take for granted that progressive realization is inevitable and irreversible, though to be fair he also doesn't say that people are condemned to ignorance and lack of understanding in perpetuity

the catch though is that there is a recurring failure to pass the lessons down properly, and so what gets passed down are failed lessons... thus the result is years of war (and the constant repetition of attempts to reform things in a bid to halt wars, only to fail again and result in more war, and so on)

here he is also saying that everyone, from the bottom to the top (soldiers, politicians, etc) are participated in the world for wrong reasons. Yeah, it starts with blind rage, but that never-ending battle is just an exhausting suffering with no end and at the end, they seek relief, not the righteousness. Righteousness comes of as just a mere excuse

it is almost as if the lesson of heaven is that one yet to learn the lesson (akin to the socratic admission of knowing that one does not know)

the trauma of warfare after all isn't just the physical damage, but also the psychological scars (and the conceptual scandals and dysfunctional worlds generated)

and this brings us to the great debate between the ideas of Zhuge Liang and Sima Yi...

note that Sima Yi's thesis isn't that people are evil at their core or that the world is irredeemably doomed, but only that there is (much) evil in the world (or to put it in another way, that people don't always go the right way)

but since the world is teeming with those who stray, to defy the trend head-on (using clean and principled means, by trying to appeal and convert everyone to the way, hoping that everyone would just repent) is a fool's errand (inverting the metaphor used in Sunzi's Art of War about an army with properly used energy having the impact of 'a grindstone against an egg')

however, the other alternative to slow preaching or witnessing, raising a moral crusade or a virtuous inquisition to eradicate evil and enforce justice, is a bloody and lengthy one, the effects of which may not inspire virtuous living at all but would just bring more misery to those affected by the conflict (note that this applies no matter what sets of values and principles one would uphold as the right way, and so incidentally even the 'reformist' project of Dong Zhuo or Guo Jia's dark art are implicated in the accusation)

what then is Sima Yi's proposal? like a merchant responding to market trends, he suggests going with whatever is expedient and convenient

in troubled times with many going about their own way regardless of morality, the suggestion is that perhaps it would be advantageous to support a rising hegemon that would have enough control of a unified force that can put a stop to the fighting as soon as feasible (by suppressing the other contenders and intimidating many participants and bystanders into submission, while also appealing to the weariness of others who would be ready to submit to anyone who can pacify things)

note that the emphasis of the approach is not so much on the ruthless methods (though those aren't off the table), but on expediting the process towards relative equilibrium (that is to say, brutality isn't strictly required, but the hegemon must be pragmatic, able to use different means on different occasions, harmonizing various forces in an effective manner)

Zhuge Liang puts a premium on principle though, which is where the disagreement can be found

in 108 he stressed the matter of rulers setting a good example, and in 159 he mentions how loyalty discourse should be used simply to discourage the ambitious from fomenting unrest for their own vested interests

we'll get more into that (and how he shifted) in a bit

Sima Yi's proposal basically involves going with the flow and bending to the dominant trends, plus investing on a viable contender, helping that party co-opt more people into the fold (with force if expedient, but given the mercantile angle, this is more about selling the prospective regime using various tricks, and inducing many to sell out and join the bandwagon)... and then, when the opportunity arises, enact a takeover from within

as for the takeover bit, I see it as not necessarily advocating for an internal coup (though that is not off the table should the hegemon prove incapable of inaugurating an era of stability and moreover the suggestion foreshadows what the Sima clan will do to the Cao clan), as this could also be taken to simply mean reining in the top hegemon so that governance is prioritized over prospects of future conquest

incidentally, that happens to be Xun Yu's end game for Cao Cao to serve merely as a protector of Han rather than as a usurper

and this is where the tension comes in... how can one 'take over' or 'keep things in control' if the hegemon starts purging retainers to further consolidate control? and how would a takeover or moderation attempt be perceived by other parties and succeeding generations?

in another note, Liaoyuan Huo's suggestion in 115 seems to be, if a hegemon is skilled and benevolent enough (plus with sufficient backing), coup attempts can be discouraged and kept at bay

after all, while both Qin Shihuang (Ying Zheng, first emperor of Qin) and Han Gaozu (Liu Bang, first emperor of Han) used ruthless means to take control, the latter was more cunning when it comes to governance (not to mention that his retainers were able to resolve an internal crisis early on), thus explaining why Qin didn't last long while Han lasted centuries

to recapitulate the disagreement in a simplified fashion: to uphold one's vision of the greater good, is it better to launch a clean crusade (and using one's campaign as an example to emulate), or engage in a convenient coup (and getting things done no matter how messy the process)

at the end of the chapter, Zhuge Liang slumbers to begin scheming intensely, and it seems that his resolution to solve the problem involves using sneaky ways to uphold a crusade (with Liu Bei as the figurehead)

thus he steps up in spreading the heroic tales of Liu Bei while forming his own shadowy network of agents (even before he formally joins Liu Bei years later)

if the root irony in volume 19 (as stated in 151) is that the rightful dominion of an emperor (blessed by heaven with the mandate to rule) had to be obtained by conquest (essentially swindling and seizing control from other contenders who could have received the mandate)

then the core irony in volume 22 (as stated in 180) is that a social order conducive enough for virtuous practice and governance (dreamt of by idealists and reformers who often don't get to live to see their proposals implemented) had to be paid for by scoundrels and hegemons (who are then appropriately condemned in the historical accounts)

Zhuge Liang actually cares about the lives of people and understands the nature of people around him, which helps him to predict the "weather" of warring world. "any means necessary" for him is not a shortsighted excuse to just kill someone and hope that not every 7 billion human being will have to die by his hands, to maintain the peace. For example, he is actually trying to achieve peace by introducing the "Three Kingdoms", artificially making a saviour "Jesus figure" which will give people hopes for peace and whatnot.

essentially 181 is where the party is about to wind down, but not without revealing some surprises along the way

the nice thing about action scenes is that (unless one wishes to discuss the nuances and niceties in the choreography and the paneling) one can go through them fairly quickly

one thing to note is that while the narrow quarters restrict Zhang Liao’s effective range (and moreover can presumably lead to situations where a miscalculated swing can lead to the blade getting stuck or someone’s grip on the weapon messing up), the narrow quarters also restrict opportunities for evasion

another nice touch about Ravages is that it depicts weapons and armor as being fragile

even though Zhang Liao had the upper hand in that round when it comes to melee weapons, Liaoyuan Huo has some surprises in store (too bad we don’t really get to see this segment on-panel)

Ravages also likes to add subtle hints winking and nudging about the next steps and the upcoming revelations

in this case, Liaoyuan Huo insinuates that Zhang Liao and Zhang Fei may have secretly agreed upon something

I mentioned previously how the schemes of Lu Bu and Zhang Fei hinge on which side the outlaws would take, and it’s amusing that these outlaws (other than Cao Cao) turned out to be the biggest beneficiaries during this incident

this is the equivalent to the same set of hired guns playing with and profiting from two rival groups that seek to outbid one another in securing the mercenary services

and then Zhang Fei makes his big reveal, that it turns out the strategic goal all along was to abandon Xuzhou (since given Liu Bei’s reputation as a heroic loyalist, certain warlords elsewhere would like to welcome him, not to mention this further tarnishes Lu Bu’s reputation)

yet one has to wonder way they did not purged those outlaws

I think the outlaws were militarily powerful (they could be the same group as the Mount Tai bandits who show up on-panel in 231, defecting to Lu Bu’s side after Xun Yu’s abduction), and neither Lu Bu nor Liu Bei would want to waste effort suppressing them completely

now not to be outdone, Lu Bu unveils his own twist, the so-called sixteenth move (which involves Chen Gong taking a troop with him to a low-key city in Xuzhou, where Chen Gui is harboring and protecting Liu Bei’s wives)

deluxe volume 11 also gives the full name of Wu as Wu Hui

more importantly, the two sides were careful not just to minimize their own casualties, but also to minimize the adverse impact on the commoners (and that is why it often takes a complex method to do something simple, since one has to consider many factors)

there’s also a side discussion touching upon how the uninvolved can see through the charade

this is not to say that outsiders are familiar with all the details the insiders have to deal with, but outsiders can surmise the wider picture (or at least the broad outlines of it) and ask the bigger questions since they are not as caught up in the moment, wrapped in the fog of war

an alternate translation of the quote from the Analects goes:

“If the Way is being realized in the world then show yourself; if it is not, then go into reclusion”

this can either refer to Pang Tong taking his step, or perhaps Zhuge Liang and Liu Bei lying low

the 'five hegemons’ may also be an indirect reference to the five hegemons of the Spring and Autumn period

and then there’s the foreshadowing of a realm split into three, roughly along geographical lines 

there’s a minor design error in the painting though as shown in the chapter title page, since Sima Hui and Pang Tong speak of the 5 mountains arranged as a northern one, a southeastern one, and three in the south (and southwest) lumped together, but instead the painting shows two northern mountains and three southern ones… still, the painting looks nice nonetheless

essentially the prediction is about a tripartite balance whereby one faction holds the areas north of the yellow river, another holds the eastern areas by the long river, and the third holds the south-central heartland plus the southwestern mountains (for the most part the 3 kingdoms after Han adopt a similar arrangement with the notable exception being that Wu rather than Shu gets to hold the south-central area instead due to the intrigues involving Guan Yu’s downfall though story-wise the prediction does not state for instance who will control the northwest)

now even without Lu Bu’s sneaky move, we must consider that Yuan Shu has more resources than Liu Bei, and so had the campaign dragged out Liu Bei would be at a disadvantage despite having the talents of Guan Yu and Zhang Fei

of course it’s revealed a few pages later that this incident of Guan Yu threatening to execute Zhang Fei (low-key playing with Liu Bei’s sentiments about the brotherhood) was all for show - to nudge Liu Bei a little more towards the breaking point into the dark side

now, we’re not shown how the Zhongjia troops were able to defeat the Han loyalist troops (since last time we saw, Liu Bei was able to secure at least one stronghold)

however, I could speculate the following scenario: with Lu Bu’s sudden takeover of Xuzhou, Zhang Fei was forced to withdraw (while certain other troops simply surrendered to Lu Bu), which means the frontlines could no longer count on supply deliveries or fresh reinforcements… and since Yuan Shu presumably has more troops in reserve (not to mention the agreed-upon plan between Ji Ling and Zhang Liao in 175 to strike Liu Bei from behind), perhaps the surprise attack was timed just when Lu Bu was able to drive Zhang Fei out

this means at the very least that Yuan Shu’s troops are not total pushovers when they have the advantage, haha

in another note, we could see that Liu Bei deeply feels bad about the people who lost their lives (and doubly so since his efforts ended in failure, not to mention he lost his territorial foothold, and his wives are hostages)

and thus begins Liu Bei’s journey to the dark side (eventually as he gets darker he discards his dark cape and sticks to a light-colored robe green if we are to believe the game pics)

let us recall

Liu Bei in the early chapters was willing to be misunderstood and engage in some underhanded schemes, but his red line was that he refused to take advantage of others for his own gain (Guan Yu nudged him a bit by convincing him to play the part of a hero, Zhang Fei outright hijacked his plans to remain a straw sandal bandit by drugging him)

then Liu Bei slowly accepted that in troubled and messy times, some form of self-serving behavior is unavoidable, but nevertheless he remained steadfast in upholding loyalty to Han and treating a guest well (Zhang Fei’s next plan was to further cultivate Liu Bei’s ruthless side while also enhancing his reputation as an underdog, 2 birds in 1 stone)

eventually after almost being killed by Lu Bu’s second backstab Liu Bei becomes more self-interested and becomes more protective about his reputation, coming to see it as an asset and a weapon in the power struggle (arguably in the late game he remains sincere and sentimental, but less about Han and more about those he deems his bros and pals)

on Guan Yu, while it may seem that Ravages didn’t renovate his image as much (Chen Mou even admitted that his sacred image is too influential to be tweaked that much), but one can note that perhaps in Ravages Guan Yu isn’t that awesome of a paragon for virtue (Zhang Fei even hints at that in a monologue in 102), but neither is he a fraud who only pretends to be virtuous… rather, it would seem that (like many people) he’s simply trying hard to uphold the examples of the sages and would like to maintain a similar reputation (the further nuance explored in later chapters seems to be that he doesn’t simply maintain the reputation of being virtuous, but also virtuously tries to perform the persona that the virtuous do not care about being praised for appearing virtuous)

I should note though that his beard his shorter than the usual depictions, haha

here Pang Tong basically recaps Zhang Fei’s strategic goals (and while he doesn’t know Zhang Fei’s other goal about fetching a 'Liu Bang’ and remolding Liu Bei further he speculates that the departure would give Liu Bei the opportunity to swallow up the domains of Liu Biao and Liu Zhang)

incidentally, in the Romance it is Pang Tong who manages to conveniently convince Liu Bei to take an ambitious step and seize control of Yizhou from Liu Zhang, so it’s amusing to see a nod to that early on (even though Pang Tong is also misleading Sima Hui into thinking he’s backing Liu Bei, when in fact he’s paving the way for Liu Chong)

Pang Tong’s iconic line for this chapter may perhaps indicate that of the 8, he’s the one who relishes in intrigues and power struggles the most (even though he’s a Han loyalist of sorts)

also, the description given to him was mis-translated… Pang Tong is pragmatic [實用] rather than utilitarian [功利] (Guo Jia’s views may be closer to a broadly consequentialist approach to morality)

ironically he joins Liu Bei’s side later on

for those familiar with the period it’s a foregone thing (though Ravages messes with that expectation by having him help Liu Chong first)

if only Liu Chong had stronger bodyguards

other than the report that the hostage scheme allowed for a relatively bloodless takeover, what is interesting about this page is what it hints at: Lu Bu wanted to capture someone valuable

I think the reference is to Liaoyuan Huo

the discussion about old wounds and new wounds also suggests that regardless of Lu Bu’s reputation, he’s still fragile (and he’s weakening bit by bit)

but the struggle is all the more magnificent for that

and for someone who schemed and betrayed his way to power to decline and fall by way of scheming and betrayal… similarly terrifying

and then of course there’s this twist, which explains why Sima Yi was shown in the last part of 175

for those outlaws to receive three sets of bribes, materially speaking they’re the biggest winners in the engagement (though since they’re also part of the scheming game, they wouldn’t simply waste what they have received for momentary enjoyments)

this also lays out the plan to undermine Lu Bu from within, by secretly co-opting the Chen clan to cooperate with Cao Cao

Chen Deng must be unhappy about it since Cao Cao’s troops conducted the massacre in his home province years ago

and there’s still a long way to go before Liaoyuan Huo earns the full trust of Liu Bei’s core team…

anyway, that ends the special re-read of volume 22

in a nutshell the hostile takeover of Xuzhou is but a small piece in the larger geopolitical struggle, but what Ravages did was to make a minor skirmish more convoluted (and by extension, rendering the overall situation in a more complex manner)

basically to sum up the developments in volume 22

generally for those who don’t mind reading Ravages in a non-linear fashion, I recommend checking out the one-volume mini-arcs (particularly volumes 6, 19, and 22 since 25 contains too many big narrative turns) as condensed samples of what the Ravages text has to offer

whereas volume 6 is a neat indicator of Ravages transitioning into a more cerebral approach (though I must point out that the mind games and the reflections are already there from the start, though in the first arc the action is more prominent) and while volume 19 is the initial step beyond the first 150 chapters (themselves a workable and longer snapshot of how Ravages stepped up and matured), volume 22 is perhaps that one volume that neatly packages many salient schemes and themes together in one concise bundle

now if one were to come up with a broad outline of the story covered in volume 22 it would be as follows

chapter 175: there’s gonna be a party (and it will be a fun one)

chapter 176: meanwhile, for those missing out on the upcoming party...

chapter 177: hey let’s prepare some stuff for the party

chapter 178: on the night of the party and we're counting down to the main event

chapter 179: IT’S PARTY TIME

chapter 180: in the meantime, someone who isn’t on the party is exposing what parties really mean

chapter 181: party’s almost over, time to wrap up

chapter 182: the mourning after the party

Saber/Rider Kingship (leadership, more like)

Saber - her kingship is exclusively centered around her ideals (that she should sacrifice everything, even herself, for her people) of how she is supposed to lead her people. Hiding her gender (idk how can you do that, when everyone in present time is aware of her gender the first time they meet her) is basically a final nail to the point, that she is detached from everything, for the sake of her kingdom.

But her worth in the story comes only from her power, Excalibur and not from her personally. She, in fact, is utterly humiliated for doing so, without actually defending herself. How can such a king be presented as a mere "little girl", who, despite all the experience, acts completely naive and fragile? No idea. Nothing is explained. Otherwise show could not shove down our throats the idea that "everyone should live to satisfy oneself, instead of suffering for others", I guess... (in the last scene, she is praised as the greatest king by the one who hated her the most, for some reason, though)

Our Alexander The "Great" on the other hand, is someone who is satisfying himself. "if you are satisfied, your people too will be satisfied"... yeah, have an image of an animal who only cares about his own satisfaction through conquests that lead everyone to death for no reason and everyone will love you wholeheartedly... why does such an animal understand human nature more than the one who is giving her own life for people's sake? Who knows, who knows...

"B-but he dies!" someone could say... yeah, he dies and that is exactly what he wished for. Not to mention, that just dying is just too subtle, when you compare it to his scenes, in which he is always presented as appealing, thus being the most praised character from the series. And even when he dies after just running and not being able to do anything else, he is not humiliated. No, never. Unfounded charisma is all that matters in life, after all... Not to mention, that, apparently, its fine to kill yourself if your ideal is killing yourself, rather than killing yourself for the sake of others.

There is also Waver (who I liked as a character), who's character dynamics with Rider glorifies him even more. Waver too, as everyone else, was cold towards Rider's attitude... but, despite being as cynical as he is (manipulating people into accepting them in their family), even he decided to sacrifice himself for the sake of Rider. So what happens when the king dies? Everyone starts carrying his legacy, with the complete lack of individuality? Even depraved Gilgamesh (who understand the evils of human nature, considering the relationship with Kirei) did not prove him wrong here.

Now Ravages of Time offers more nuance when it comes to kingship. We have animalistic warlord with exploding charisma with a brain and ideals in favor of people, that dies a pathetic death by the hands of his own soldier. We have an inhuman warlord with excuses for his own greed and reputation that is damaged beyond repair for both internal and external affairs. We have a warlord who purposely damaged his own external reputation and still is praised by his soldiers, BUT still has selfish individuals under his wing. And even if there was a reckless warlord with influence, he would at least have a genius adviser at his side.

(if anyone is interested in an opposing ideas of inspirational leadership, that is executed better than in F/Z, I would recommend reading Golden Kamuy (Tsurumi vs. Hijikata))