Ravages of Time - Emperor rescue arc, volume 19

 in particular I'll be highlighting the ironies discussed and how it indicates that basically Ravages has an ironic appreciation of its sources and thus an ironic approach to its storytelling

note that irony for those used to using the term 'ironic' loosely has something to do with the modes of distance and incongruity and alienation between one thing and another

Volume starts with Sima Yi adaptiong to the loss of Huo and he also does not want children to learn about what happened to Xiao Meng - that is to highlight the irony, that these children were making the most fun of Xiao Meng, and yet they still care about him.

Now to Liu Xie... it's regrettable how Ravages doesn't give that much attention to the emperor (and the imperial court in general)

but that aside, in this arc at least we see glimpses of Liu Xie as a reflective thinker in his own right in the series (the historical accounts and the novel don't really flesh him out that much since he's seen more as a background prop of a dying regime)

note the situational irony Liu Xie finds himself in, he's supposed to be the son of heaven, and yet he's tagging along with a retinue that he does not fully control, fleeing from warlords he is unable to control

this then leads him to ponder about the kings of old (in particular the kings of Zhou who saw their prestige and authority decline throughout the spring and autumn and warring states periods though back during the old days the ruling order in the central plains was not really as centralized)

amusingly enough, 'wang' [王] ('king') used to be the preeminent term for the son of heaven (but then the lords of the rival states started appropriating that title and so after Qin conquered the other states Ying Zheng called himself 'huangdi' [皇帝], practically deifying himself, and by the time of Han 'kings' or 'princes' are just reduced to being titular nominal bosses of a glorified commandery)

and so there is something poignant about how Liu Xie is comparing himself to 'the kings', as if he were reduced to a mere titleholder in comparison to imperial prestige and power

whether you are into conquest or governing, whether you are a liar or virtuous, whether you are a proud son of heaven or a treacherous vassal ("the high ranks want power, the low ranks want power... never-ending") - you should be proactive, rather than reactive, if you want to accomplish things. Power is not only used in brutality, after all. See, even these flatterers had to take action. Only decline and eventual death comes from being passive, everything else requires effort

now things get trickier when we consider the various theories of rulership and governance in the central plains, and this ties in to the perennial tension between the civility (wen [文]) represented by 'men of letters' and the martiality (wu [武]) represented by 'men of action'

there's the confucian notion of 'rectification of names' whereby for things to be in order people just have to learn and stay in their place (thus rulers rule, ministers minister, parents act parentally, children act filially), and for the emperor what's needed is to live virtuously, follow the rituals, set an upright example, sponsor virtuous teachings, and leave much of the specifics to the ministers

and then there's also the taoist notion of 'wu wei' where the best form of governance is one that is effortless and not forceful

note that the counsel is not about being inactive, but rather that the ruler as the son of heaven must behave and act in subtle and elevated ways (with the expectation almost being, all the emperor has to do is exude moral authority like a super-parent and the ministers will get to it and implement the righteous decrees)

the irony being that from the standpoint of those below, it looks as if the emperor is merely spectating

in contrast to the ideal of sagely rulers, there are the teachings about what a good general is supposed to do, and the qualities tend to emphasize boldness and decisiveness and even the prudence to disregard orders from rulers

and this is where the irony kicks in... those who found regimes are not sages but generals who conquered their way into hegemony

To foil the emperor, now he have a focus on a crook (soldiers look above him and his "system") who is also passive and has ruined reputation, but their paths diverge later on, when crook will remain a crook and eventually death will come to him, but, on the other hand, emperor will stand up and will make use of his clout. (irony being, that diving into darkness allows one to appreciate the light)

to be fair, the related theories about the mandate of heaven emphasize what rulers are supposed to do in order to maintain the favor of heaven (and thus serve as a warning that rulers do not have an absolute right to do as they please)

what's not stated (much less defended) in the moral appeals is how exactly the mandate is transferred from one representative to another (and that's where the chronicles and annals and heroic folktales and military treatises come in, recounting and at times celebrating the blood and guts and trickery in the process of transition)

an emperor's world had to be conquered

now this can mean either that a new conqueror emerges and establishes hegemony, or a successor manages to tame residual unrest and prove worthiness to continue hegemony (incidentally this is why Yuan Shu can speak of usurpation as a tradition to be 'continued')

what's ironic about the situation is that the ruler, the son of heaven (and remember that this position is different from being a mere boss or superior), must rule with a clean hand on the one hand but must also rely on a dirty hand on the other hand

that is to say, that the ruler is neither sage nor general but must somehow bridge aspects of both (or make use of both)

note that the irony is not in the messy power struggle or in the call to virtue, but in the messy power struggle so that one secures the position of a sponsor of virtue (in other words, the irony is due to the pretentiousness and prestige of the imperial figure... imagine the incongruity in the wish for a better world but also insisting that one be placed in charge of it for the perks)

if everyone practiced virtue there wouldn't be a need for a superior pacifier, and if everyone just wanted domination there wouldn't be a need for the ceremonial role

I should also add that the 'legalist' solution (to eschew all talk of virtue and replace it with law enforcement) merely mechanizes the irony and gives the ruler a pass (by presuming the ruler to be above the law), the ironic situation remains where the lawgiver must first act without law to found and impose a legal order

before moving on to the first (derivative) irony in 152, I note how Zhang Ji offers another expression of irony, and that is by way of ironic detachment (with a dose of cynicism) to the shenanigans going on

an amusing irony here is how a ruled subject finds it easier to walk away (to some extent, by exile or escape) from the fallout of the chaos under heaven whereas the emperor, the son of heaven, is tied to it (and whose reputation and legacy depend on how things are pacified)

one other ironic thing revealed in his musings

the son of heaven requires authority and force to compel others into submission (so that the pretense of ruling by virtue can be upheld), but when the power dynamics change and unrest develops, the (disempowered if not ousted) son of heaven gets blamed as someone lacking in virtue (or bearing the responsibility for the predecessors' moral failings), haha

152 opens with the floating text that it is ironic when those with 'aspirations' (I suppose this can mean either grand ideals or bold ambitions) are born in the 'wrong time' (I surmise this means that the world seems unwelcome and alienating to people with such principles and desires, that they're seen as either 'ahead of their time' or 'behind the times')

consider for instance new rulers who had to face and overcome opposition, or sages and prophets laughed at and mocked in their lifetime (only to be revered generations later)

the black text flips the view and notes that the irony (in hindsight) is in how the very lopsided and desperate situations facilitated and enabled the emergence and struggle of iconic and notable heroes (and villains too), and this can be taken in different senses

first, what place would there be for heroes if all is right with the world? would someone be called a trailblazer if the innovations associated with that figure are already seen as common sense?

second, the frictions and tensions in a given social order shake things up and provide opportunities for those voices previously at the margins to gain a following and rise to prominence

third, when times are desperate, people could resort to manufacturing heroes (and heroic tales) as a way to cope (or alternatively, regimes and factions manufacture competing tales for their own gain)

Its an interesting aspect on why the three kingdoms era is so highly revered, as part of how various warlords are responible of sabotaging their current regime, also makes the most drastic measures of changes.

our fascination with times of unrest in general (and the people who ended up standing out even if in the larger scheme of things the heroes are not the only or even the main actors)

to put it simply, the performances worked by satisfying some particular demand from some niche (and the power struggles shape which voices and stories end up dominating)

fortunately, power struggles never end, otherwise the victors get to permanently game things in their favor

unfortunately, power struggles never end, which means the gaming continues but under different regimes

on a side note, revisiting Lu Buwei's coup in Kingdom and Ying Zheng's 'light' discourse, ironically it can be read as the 'legalist' program of solving all war by ending all struggle and setting up a rigidly defined order with the emperor on top and the subjects following all the laws under harsh penalties in the name of progress, haha

(that is what history written by victors aspires to be, but because power struggles never end, it was possible for Qin and Han to collapse... and that is the irony that Ravages is working on in its approach)

the somewhat humorous conversation between Duan Wei and Wu Xi offers a glimpse of how the majesty and management of imperial Han have degraded

the question about what makes an imperial palace can be read as an ironic echo of the supposed centrality of the emperor in the cosmic and world order (on paper it's the emperor who decides where the imperial residence will be in accordance with ritual and strategic considerations, it's the emperor who decides how all under heaven is to be organized into provinces and commanderies), and that if the emperor doesn't even plan to stay in the city anymore (as he's fleeing from the infighting) why bother protecting it

note too that Chang'an (incidentally, built close to where the Qin capital Xianyang which Xiang Yu burnt was located) was the capital of former Han before the relocation to Luoyang (and as we know in the series, Dong Zhuo forced the move back to Chang'an)

the punchier quip though would be the joke about Chang'an becoming the most 'peasant friendly' palace in history due to the food raids (made more amusing when contrasted with the stories of either victorious emperors bringing wealth to the realm, or virtuous emperors sharing stuff to the populace)

almost as if the sarcastic praise is that the emperor is so good he left the palace for the starving peasants to claim

people who read Ravages more widely remember its rough (and rather simplistic when seen at face value) remarks about history being written by the victors

but I daresay that Ravages has a more nuanced and ironic appreciation of its sources (in a characteristically 'postmodern' fashion), and volume 19 in particular highlights that

Yang Feng denounces Li Jue and Guo Si for having the audacity to slaughter Liu Xie's retinue (we can safely presume until proven otherwise that the consorts who show up in 151 named only in a special character list and according to the historical accounts died on Cao Cao's orders later on are prematurely killed off and spared the later intrigues), and what's amusing is how Guo Si's alibis would also be the same excuses that 'loyalist' ministers say when they get rid of certain factions

note the situational irony (Guo Si acting as if he were some loyalist while committing treachery in broad daylight) and the dramatic irony (those familiar with 3K lore know that indeed Li Jue and Guo Si will be branded as disloyal and incompetent warlords, but to an extent so will Yang Feng)

and then Guo Si has the audacity to lecture Liu Xie on appropriate behavior for the emperor (that the ruler should rule in the ruler's palace, that it does not befit the ruler to be wandering in some wilderness and not attending to court matters)

ironically, this disregards the idea that it's the emperor who decides where the capital is, as the emperor gets to rule all under heaven by receiving the heavenly mandate to propagate virtue and care for the people

again, I note that the irony is generated in part due to the privileged position of imperial discourse (if we're just talking about realpolitik, we see a figurehead being threatened to stay in place)

with Liu Xie's reflections we see how this arc (when Cao Cao acquires the emperor) relates to the previous one (when Yuan Shu acquired the imperial seal)

in the larger scheme of things, the position of the son of heaven after all functions as an ideological stamp of approval to a given hegemonic order (sure, in theory it's the rulers who rule in the name of heaven, but in their ruling they effectively validate whatever policies formulated by ministers that get implemented and whichever factions emerging from power struggles and social developments that rise to prominence)

Xu Huang's lesson (or rather, Xun Yu's lesson as delivered by Xu Huang) is that rulers have to assert their authority and virtue (the idea being that the performance exudes an aura that virtuous subjects recognize and worship)

the tricky thing though is that the notion of ruling makes sense only alongside the notion of following (rulers rule if followers follow, but if there are no followers how could there be rulers)

in other words, how does one who aspires to rule get others to follow as a consequence

the ideal sage kings (as represented by Yao and Shun) embody the notion that among the virtuous, the one with greater virtue and merit gets recognized as superior and the incumbent steps down in favor of a new superior

the dynastic founders invoke the narrative of forcefully replacing an incumbent unjust regime (or in the case of Qin, forcefully reconsolidating all under heaven) and receiving the mandate to deliver justice

perhaps one key insight Liu Xie learned is that at the very least, even if he never succeeds in revitalizing imperial Han, the practice of ruling (even if the policy details depend more on the ministers and the bureaucracy) involves an active theatrical and morale component, using various techniques to inspire a following and propagate virtue

incidentally, one can even come up with a version of the morale theory for rulers: if there is occasional unrest, blame it on the troublemakers (and enforce the law); if there is frequent disorder, blame it on the dysfunctional ministers (and reform the government); if there is pervasive chaos in all under heaven, condemn the warring factions as bold but ambitious and self-serving (and either admonish or punish them)

the tricky thing about the mandate of heaven though is that the stipulation concerns the conditions for keeping it (it doesn't matter that Liu Bang was a scoundrel, what matters is that he could govern with benevolence) and how one ends up losing it (Ying Zheng vanquished the other states but did not really pacify the people with virtue), but heaven is silent on whoever ends up getting it (and what's not stated is that the absence of rules means the scramble for the mandate is basically lawless, the transition could be as peaceful as Yao and Shun, or as bloody as the warring states)

and indeed this is all 'fate' insofar as the broader conditions and consequences (including the ambitions of others) are beyond the effective control of any ruler no matter how virtuous (at best a regime can simply respond to developments accordingly, and plan for potential calamities)

and only now do we begin to address the second (derivative) irony

one of the stock arguments in favor of monarchical rule (with clear succession rules) is that future rulers get to have the benefit of learning how to govern at an early age (the consolation for those who prioritize virtue and merit would be that they at least can still rise as advisers and ministers to help the ruler remain good)

of course, in many cases designated heirs become complacent in their privilege (setting aside the messy succession disputes) and end up not learning, although there are a few who take benevolent governance seriously as part of the inherited mantle

what's amusing is, in relation to the first (derivative) irony, Dong Cheng wouldn't praise Liu Xie as an exemplary late learner if his predecessors didn't mess up to begin with (or to put it in another way, Liu Xie would not be able to experience this harsh learning moment if Han did not degrade so much in his time)

153 starts with the floating text that says

it is ironic when one finally learns the way when it is too late

I suppose this refers to the situation where one takes something for granted until the regret comes much later on

in the context of Han, Liu Xie's awakening is not just a personal lesson for him, but also a lesson by association for the imperial line (his predecessors failed, but he awakens at a most awkward time)

admittedly it's hard to figure out what is ironic about the statement... on the level of imagery the suggestion seems to be that the ones who learn at dusk (incidentally I'm reminded of an iconic line from Hegel about the owl of Minerva flying at dusk a remark about the belatedness of philosophical insight relative to what's unfolding in the world) don't end up basking in the dawn of a new era

extrapolating from it, perhaps the irony is that someone else ends up benefiting from what others had to learn the hard way

when it comes to rulership, someone learns (by being disempowered) that the mandate can be lost, but someone else ends up seizing or swindling the mandate as a result

this raises an intriguing question: the golden light shines on conquerors, but have they learned before dusk?

on that note, Sun Ce's notion of continuation contends that learning does happen one generation at a time, that the lessons get passed on to new waves (that is to say, the new waves are the conquerors who seize the day until they grow old and pass on more lessons to the next batch)

but the cyclical pattern of dawn and dusk seems to suggest that lessons get repeated over and over...

Dong Cheng expresses a relatively straightforward ironic situation (he doesn't have the luxury of choosing to sacrifice or flee like Zhang Ji has)

the conundrum facing loyalists like Dong Cheng is that on the one hand ministers must minister to the ruling ruler, but on the other hand ministers must not usurp power from the ruler

this brings us to the complicated relationship between minister and ruler

under ideal circumstances where sage kings rule, all ministers have to do is implement the wise judgments and just decrees (perhaps making adjustments and filling in the details when appropriate)

under suboptimal circumstances the compromise solution (perhaps with a tinge of self-interest as the theorists see people like themselves as the ones to help the ruler) is to have rulers delegate areas of concern to talented ministers and letting the capable govern the spheres assigned to them... however, this arrangement also provides opportunities for usurpation of authority in the name of promoting talent, and in effect Dong Cheng is accusing Cao Cao of taking that track

the ambivalence of Cao Cao's response is that he's not outright denying the ulterior motives, but he's not confirming them either

instead he pivots toward the discourse of seizing opportunities, blaming Dong Cheng for not using his authority to keep corrupt subjects in check (note that the ruler does not do everything alone, the ministers are there to minister and help in the governance) for fear of being (seen as) disloyal

the subtext seems to be that although rulers are expected to be paragons of virtue (even though in practice they hardly live up to the ideals), ministers can't avoid the issue of dirty (and sometimes bloody) hands

thus the other ironic situation Dong Cheng finds himself in is that his concern about loyalty (or the appearance thereof) prevented him from fully exercising his loyal duties, whereas an alleged usurper such as Cao Cao ends up becoming a pillar for Han (even if he's doing it for his own longer-term regime change plan, something that loyalists could have kept in check had they used their authority more forcefully)

on a side note, if I recall some 'legalist' text proposed censoring all talk of virtue and governance among commoners because the duty of commoners is not to philosophize about the greater good but to fulfill the tasks demanded of them by the ruler

now as for the third (derivative) irony, it may take a bit more extrapolation to elucidate what is ironic about the juxtaposition of 'loyalist' and 'flatterer'

suppose we take flatterers to mean those who pander to those in dominant positions (out of self-interest), while loyalists are those who care about protecting and enhancing what they have sworn to serve

perhaps the irony is that the flatterers like to call themselves loyalists and so the latter get mistaken for the former

or maybe that loyalists don't prioritize recognition and stay in the background (or even accrue misleading reputations), even as flatterers end up being misrecognized as loyalists

another way to look at it could be that loyalists (especially those loyal to a longstanding tradition or institution rather than just to some charismatic personality) either tend to posthumously flatter venerated founding figures for their own institutional gain (after all, it's not as if the sages and conquerors of old benefit from praises and rituals about them long after they have passed), or they end up flattering rulers with favorable examples (from the good old classics) to get them to conform to established ways

and then the twist kicks in with the revelation of the black text

being recognized as a loyalist in troubled periods (especially when the ruler is not distinguished) turns out to be a high level of praise (and flattery)

note how in good times when rulers appear strong much of the credit goes to them for ruling well, for appointing talented ministers, and so on... but in bad times when rulers fade into the background as absentees or figureheads, lo and behold much of the attention turns to certain loyalists as heroic pillars trying to keep things together

now when we consider that the demand is for everyone to be loyal and filial (and thus mere loyalty shouldn't be a mark of excellence but a general value for all subjects), when certain people are singled out for being a rare loyal exemplar it becomes a telltale sign of something dysfunctional (it's akin to praising a government official for not taking bribes)

a brief note on the tragic irony of Zhang Ji's situation and decisions

on the one hand, he urges his stubborn comrades to quit while they can (rightly pointing out they can't even manage a single city) though in the process he was at least able convince his subordinates to return to farming... but on the other hand, he finds himself unable to run away from the fighting (despite his ironic detachment from the pretensions of the power struggle) due to some sense of obligation toward those he failed to convince, and all this despite him having the best chances to walk away from it all (Jia Xu even offered a way out)

he could have had his own farmland saga back in Xiliang (or in Nanyang with his nephew) but instead was killed off in a symbolic last stand (and Xiahou Dun didn't even need to do the deed except to highlight the futility of it all)

setting aside the question of classifying particular acts or situations as right or wrong, what is clear is the notion that right is not wrong and wrong is not right

what is unclear is how to transform a world full of wrong into a world full of right (the dispute between Sima Yi's theory and Zhuge Liang's theory is an illustration of the transformation problem), and heaven is silent on the matter

a hegemon can forcefully make others submit and effectively pacify the realm and yet still set a wrong example, while a reformer can advocate improvements in vain and yet still be recognized as a role model

the fourth (derivative) irony is perhaps the most straightforward of them, namely the idea that people ignore even the best of advice if it bothers them

now the black text for 155 has a deceptive punch to it, when viewed in light of the previous ironies

who doesn't like flattery

when one of the best flatteries (for long-term moral remembrance) happens to be calling someone a principled loyalist who doesn't care about flattery, an earnest tragic student who cares more about learning at dusk than basking in the glory of dawn...

the tricky thing about the pursuit of virtue is that on the one hand a good example/witness/story (compared to, say, abstract arguments) is an effective way to propagate virtue and make others recognize it (didactic tales and parables and fables last long for a reason), but on the other hand stories of virtue can become exercises in self-aggrandizement

and so, who's to say that the stories we have of able ministers are not propagandistic distortions that simultaneously offer a good example for others to emulate while also covering up certain inadequacies and making the ministers' reputations better than the reality

this reminds me of the early Liu Bei, who didn't want to glorify himself but was convinced by his bros that a heroic tale (even if exaggerated) will benefit the people, haha

now that we've cleared the main ironic points, the last 3 chapters of volume 19 should be easier to deal with

come to think of it, the rise of Qin (and more generally, the dominance of ruthless hegemons some of whom may become good enough rulers later on) offers an ironic twist to what the mandate of heaven conveys

what if 'the will of the people' is not so much that they unanimously want someone they deem superior in virtue and talent to rule over them, but merely that they just want the bloody wars to stop and will settle for anyone (even a scoundrel) who can quickly rise to the top and quell other contenders (basically the 'twisted rationality' of a battered hostage populace that Zhuge Liang denounces)

this darkens the mandate of heaven from a call to govern benevolently and propagate virtue, to a call to keep people sufficiently pacified and satisfied (perhaps the divergence of Xunzi from Mengzi is reflective of this more pragmatic turn)

to be fair Liue Xie,despite channeling the energy of successful persuasion friendship speeches in shounen series, has a point - if one insists on the confucian model of people knowing and staying in their place (and what's more, he's basically performing the moral authoritativeness expected of rulers, though the irony is that this happens at a time when the prestige of Han is at its low point)

to reiterate, it's ironic that Liu Xie gets his one chance to use his awesome imperial virtue to directly sway a cunning warlord and his troops, at a point when Liu Xie is at his most vulnerable on a physical and military level

and we never get to see him like this again even as his prestige is somewhat restored with Cao Cao's help (he's still disempowered, but that's just a return to the days with Dong Zhuo)

to add to the incongruence, if Liu Xie lived in a more sheltered and secure time (if his father had acted more authoritatively), he wouldn't have had the chance to flex those moral muscles and inspire a fleeting sense of nostalgia (because subjects like Cao Cao would have to worry more about the coercive force of regular imperial troops if he dared to rebel and disobey)

in another note, Cao Cao's 'balanced' response to puzzles of governance is notably pragmatic in orientation, seeing the tensions between martiality and civility, virtue and violence, light and darkness as a matter of using the right mix at the right situation

he sidesteps many of the ironies mainly because he isn't aiming to become emperor and be caught up in the entanglements that come packaged with the prestigious role

and then the volume ends with a preparation chapter that continues the ironic explorations, but this time without much of the drama that accompanied Liu Xie's adventures

here the focus is no longer on the tension between lofty expectations on imperial rule and the material messiness in the accumulation of power, but shifts to the classic theme of the inscrutability of human intentions (and desires), one of those engines that keep irony and deception going

note how some of the characters in the chapter play around with the reputations they've acquired (or better yet, the reputations they'll come to acquire once they become immmortalized in 3K lore) and emphasize the point, that for all that's said about them, who knows what they are really thinking about (basically flipping the setup of dramatic irony by anticipating what audiences allegedly know about them but insisting on a secret)

and beyond the usual refrain in Ravages about historical accounts being distorted by winning factions (which also involves its own irony considering that winners don't last forever and the victors of one round have no say in how their image and those of the previous losers will be manipulated by victors of the next), the more basic factor that continues to cast shadows of doubt on all attempts at re-membering what has passed would be the distance, the gap, the degrees and modes of separation and alienation between the discourse and what is allegedly discussed about...

composers of stories and records may be under the influence of regimes in their time, but who knows what they are thinking about and what they have in store for readers

however, it needs to be emphasized that for all the critiques and disavowals, Ravages does not say to throw away the sources (if anything, if the documents are treacherous, then all the more reason to keep them closer like frenemies to better conduct closer scrutiny and perform one's own interpretative betrayals)

and here I'd like to once again address the issue of prior familiarity with 3K lore

strictly speaking, one can grasp the main threads of the story without having encountered the lore before (if one is fluent in the source language or the translated languages, one can read Ravages in some way)

and yet, the ironic and critical approach Ravages takes means that the sources continue to haunt it (and the more one is exposed to them, the more hidden connections and phantom allusions and asides and inside jokes one gets to notice).